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CONTRACT LAW AND TEE COMMUNITY
I propose in this talk to consider some aspects of the 
modern South African law of contract in relation to society# But 
although my concern is with the modern law, I cannot escape a 
brief backward glance at the origins of the South African law of 
contract, for the present structure of this branch of the law, 
and to a great extent also its limitations, can be understood 
only in relation to its history.
The origins of our law of contract must be sought in 
Rome, In spite of a certain serious limitation, the Roman law of 
contracts reached a very mature stage of development, whereby it 
was able to serve the needs of a considerable international com­
merce, The limitation was the failure of the Romans to achieve 
any general theory of contract - one may go further and say, any 
general law of contract. The Romans recognised and enforced a 
number of particular contracts - such as sale, letting and hiring, 
partnership and some others. Outside of these actionable con­
tracts, an agreement was a mere nudum pactum, and unenforceable.
On the other hand, the rules of the recognised contracts were 
thoroughly worked out, and could later be generalised without 
much difficulty or conflict.
The Classical Roman law, which was the Roman law at its 
greatest level of achievement, was strongly individualistic in 
character: it accorded a great measure of liberty in the field of 
private law. The law of contract shared this characteristic: 
within very broad limits the parties to a contract could deter­
mine their obligations as they pleased.
When the Roman law was received in Western Europe in 
the fifteenth and following centuries, the Roman law relating to 
particular contracts was generalised. The principle was adopted 
that every agreement which was seriously made and which was not 
contrary to public policy or good morals, was enforceable as a 
contract, A body of principles was elaborated which was common 
to all types of contract: today we speak of the general princi­
ples of contract, and these are more numerous and important than 
the rules which apply only to particular types of contract.
The other great influence upon the South African law 
of contract has been the English law of the nineteenth century. 
During that century the Roman-Dutch law was strongly influenced 
in almost every department by the English law, and the law of 
contract was affected by this influence to a greater extent, per­
haps, than was any other branch of law. It is necessary, there-
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fore, to know something of the character of the English law of 
contract of that time. During the nineteenth century, English 
law was profoundly transformed by that body of economic theory 
which is often roughly if somewhat inaccurately described as 
laissez faire. The need of the age was for a law of contract 
which would set as few impediments as possible to initiative, 
to the movement of goods and of labour, and the response to this 
need finds its highest expression in the words of Sir George 
Jessel in a case decided in 1 8 7 5 ; D
'’If there is one thing which, more than another, 
public policy requires, it is that men of full 
age and competent understanding shall have the 
Utmost liberty of contracting and that their 
contracts shall be enforced by Courts of
Justice",
"The utmost liberty of contracting" became a watchword 
of the day. Contractual theory adjusted itself to this need and 
response. Parties to a contract were conceived as lawmakers in 
their field: within broad limits they made law for themselves by 
their contract. They exercised a sovereignty, with which courts 
of law were extremely reluctant to interfere. Thus a writer^) on 
the philosophy of law in 1884 said: "It is impossible to draw a 
distinction between a oontract and an Act of Parliament", and 
again: "The whole operation of preparing contracts, agreements, 
settlements, conveyances and such deeds is purely legislative"„2) 
In accordance with this theory the courts adhered to an extre­
mely narrow conception of their function in the field of con­
tract, This judicial reticence found expression in such dicta 
as the following: "The dealings of men must as far as possible
be treated as effective, and the law must not incur the reproach 
of being the destroyer of bargains"j?)and the oft-repeated dictum 
that "the court must not attempt to make a contract for the 
parties"
There can be little doubt that this individualistic 
conception of contract, this doctrine of freedom of contract, 
accorded both with the spirit of the times and with its greatest 
needs. The doctrine rested, however, upon at least one assump­
tion which was always partly false, and which has become falser 
with the passage of time* The typical transaction envisaged by 
the doctrine of freedom of contract was that between two indivi­
duals of approximately equal bargaining power, These two indi­
viduals would reach agreement by negotiation of their transac­
tion clause by clause, and the contract which resulted ©as the 
expression of their united wills - an exercise of their joint
3severeignty. The role of the court was to do no more than to 
give effect to their intentions, and if necessary enforce the 
Contract which was their creature according to its terms#
As time went on, however, the negotiated agreement 
between individuals of substantially equal bargaining power be­
came less and less typical# It was superseded to a great ex­
tent by agreements between organised groups of individuals on 
each side, or an organised group on one side and an individual 
on the other. In this latter type of transaction, in which 
there is usually a very marked imbalance of economic power, 
there has been a strong tendency for the element of n e g o t i a t e s  
to disappeart and the sovereignty which is exercised is not 
that of the parties jointly» but that of the party which is an 
organised group.
The basic theory of contract, however, continues to 
postulate as typical the negotiated contract between individu­
als; it continues to assert the dogma of freedom of contract 
and the passive role of the court; and it continues to affirm 
that contracts must be enforced in accordance with what is 
still called the * intention of the parties’ # Today these as­
sumptions and doctrines are preventing the courts from moulding 
the law of contract to the changed needs of contemporary socie­
ty, They are frustrating the natural growth of this important 
branch of the law#
These effects are being felt in South Africa as well 
as in England# The generalised law of contract of the received 
Roman law of Western Europe retained the individualistic charac­
ter of the Classical Roman law of contracts# To this tradition 
South Africa has been heir# Upon it have been superimposed the 
even more uncompromisingly individualistic doctrines of the 
English law. Observations like that of Sir George Jessel have 
been echoed many times in the South African courts, and the 
doctrine of freedom of contract and the emphasis upon the inten­
tion of the parties are as entrenched here as in England#
Against this background I want to indicate some few 
of the weaknesses of modern contract law, and some of the ways 
in which these weaknesses are exploited, and to consider what 
remedies for the situation may be available#
Probably the most significant development in the pre­
sent century in the law of contract of most western countries 
has been the vastly Increased importance of the standard con-
4tract, sometimes called contract of adhesion. This phenomenon 
is of course familiar enough in everyday life; most important 
contracts with which we come into contact are of a standardised 
character. Contracts of sale or lease of land are very common­
ly standardised, and contracts tSor the carriage of storage of 
goodSj hire-purchase contracts, air- and steamship passenger 
contracts, insurance contracts and a great many others are gen­
erally contained in printed forms prepared by the dealer or 
business party, and used without variation in all his transact­
ions, The terms of these contracts are not - in the main - 
negotiated between the parties; they are dictated by one party 
to the other. The only freedom of one of the parties is the 
freedom to contract or not. In some cases, indeed, he will 
find that a particular contract form is standardised throughout 
the trade or business, and it is of no use to him to shop else­
where for different terms.
This standardisation of contract is not something to 
be deplored. It is simply one aspect of the streamlining of 
business* It is a means of reducing costs, eliminating risks 
— usually, it must be said, by the device of passing the risks 
on to the customer, who has less ahility to insure against 
them - and facilitating administration. But it remains true 
that many of the present abuses in the law of contract are 
closely associated with the standard contract.
The truth is that these contracts not infrequently 
contain terms which are unreasonably oppressive upon one of the 
parties - that one whom we may describe, loosely, as the con­
sumer party. It is perfectly true that these terms are not al­
ways invoked - the tyrant is benevolent, or the need to invoke 
them does not arise - but the cases are not few in which they 
are brought into operation, I would like to give an example 
of such a term, although in this instance the attempt to en­
force it was unsuccessful, This was in the recent case of 
Linstrom v. V e n t e r , A  car was sold under a standard form hire- 
purchase contract for the price of £576, The price was to be 
paid as to £150 in cash and the balance in two instalments of 
£213 each. The car was delivered and £150 paid in cash, but 
the purchaser failed to pay the two instalments when they be­
came d u e 0 The seller cancelled the sale and then sought to in­
voke a clause in the contract in terms of which, if the buyer 
defaulted in his payments, the seller should be entitled to the 
return of the car, forfeiture of the arrear instalments, and 
any further damages suffered. This attempt was resisted by the 
purchaser, and the Court, when the case came before it, refused 
to allow enforcement of the term, pointing out that the effect
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of enforcing it would be to leave the seller with both the car 
and the full purchase price,
This case, then, had a reasonably satisfactory out­
come, but three things about it should be noticed,
1* The purchaser lost his deposit of £150, although there 
was no evidence that the seller had suffered loss in 
this or in any amount. This is because it is well es­
tablished in our law that a deposit or instalments ac­
tually paid may be retained by the seller if so pro­
vided by the contract irrespective of the amount or 
its relation to actual loss,
2, It- does not follow from this case that similar 
clausee. resulting in total forfeiture will not be en­
forced in the future. The case is not a binding auth­
ority, except in South West Africa where it was deci­
ded, and dissent from it in principle has been express 
sed in at least one subsequent case. In fact,this 
branch of law is in a state of considerable confusion 
and uncertainty,
3, Many purchasers, whatever their ultimate rights may be, 
will bow to the impósition of unfair contractual terms 
rather than incur the hazards and expense of litigation 
- especially when the law itself is doubtful.
An unfair type of clause which is almost ubiquitous in 
standard form contracts is that which is usually phrased somewhat 
on these lines:
"The purchaser hereby agrees that this document con­
stitutes the sole agreement between him and the sellar, 
and that no act, representation, guarantee or warranty 
of any nature whatsoever was given to him by the sel­
ler or any of his authorised agents".
This is intended, and substantially has the effect, that 
the seller or his agent may procure the purchaser’s assent by 
making positive statements of fact, the truth of which cannot 
later be canvassed, or by giving undertakings which the seller 
can honour or not in his discretion. The only limitation so far 
admitted upon the power to contract out of on e * 3 own positive 
undertakings is that of fraud, always difficult to establish. 
Indeed the meaning and effect of fraud in this context are matter 
of much uncertainty,
6Similar to this type of standard clause 
equally common, which is phrased substantially as
is another, 
follows:
"The purchaser acknowledges that he has carefully 
Inspected the goods; that he purchases them as 
they stand; and that the owner has given no war­
ranties, express or implied in law"»
This goes further than the last in that it excludes 
also the common lav/ liability for latent defects in the pro­
perty sold, and leaves the purchaser with no remedy, even if he 
sees the goods for the first time when they are delivered to 
him in a defective condition.
A particularly mischievous abuse resorted to by some 
firms was unwittingly made possible by a decision of the high­
est court in the land - the Appellate Division, There are some 
types of contractual clause whose object is so manifestly to 
penalise the other party and to make a profit out of his mis­
fortune that courts of law refuse to enforce them. Very com­
monly a standard form contract includes both legally permissi­
ble and legally unenforceable conditions, generally in the 
same clause* Such a clause cannot, of course, be enforced as a 
whole, because of the presence of the unlawful conditions, but 
in the case of Baines Motors v* P i e k , d e c i d e d  in 1955, the 
Appellate Division held that a court should in such a case sever 
the lawful provisions from the unlawful, and enforce the former 
while disregarding the latter.
The result of this case has been that many firms in­
clude clauses of this kind in their standard contracts, well 
aware that some of the provisions embodied in them cannot be en­
forced because of their penal nature* These penal clauses then 
serve a strictly temporary purpose: they are used in terrorem 
against the consumer-party, as a means of bringing pressure to 
bear upon him if he is having difficulty with his instalments*
If in the last resort the firm is obliged to bring action on the 
contract, it drops the penal provisions and seeks enforcement 
only of the others. But not infrequently, the consumer-party 
will render this unnecessary by compliance with both the enforce­
able and the unenforceable provisions, in ignorance of the lav/ 
or under threat of expensive litigation*
It would not be difficult to multiply instances of 
abuse of the contractual freedom v/hich our law allows. Insurance 
contracts Which enable the insurer, to which premiums may have 
been paid for the lifetime of the insured, to escape its oblig-
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ation of payment of the sum assured on a technical or purely 
formal breach by the insured; contracts of employment which 
deprive the employee of the entire benefit of any invention 
made by him during his employment; contracts by firms which 
repair, clean or store property, in terms of which they exempt 
themselves from liability of all kinds and cannot even be 
called to account for proved negligence - these are some of 
the cases in v/hich one party finds himself at the mercy of the 
bthn-r, and dependent entirely upon its benevolence*
The situation in South Africa is already sufficient­
ly serious; in other countries, particularly in Britain and in 
the United States, it is worse, and is causing great concern*
It will become worse in South Africa with the working out here 
of the inevitable trend of competitive capitalism towards 
monopoly. It is difficult to make any realistic attempt to 
deal with the problem as long as the legislature and the courts 
adhere to the myth of freedom of contract. These remarks of an 
American lawyer6) are worth quotings
"Society, by proclaiming freedom of contract, gua­
rantees that it will not interfere with the exer­
cise of power by contract. Freedom of contract en­
ables enterprisers to legislate by contract and, 
what is even more important, to legislate in a sub­
stantially authoritarian manner without using the 
appearance of authoritarian forms# Standard con­
tracts in particular could thus become effective 
instruments in the hands of powerful industrial and 
commercial overlords enabling them to impose a new 
feudal order of their own making upon a vast host 
of vassals",
What, then, is it possible to do about the problem?
The courts already do what they can, and I do not want to under­
estimate their achievement in this regard» In those cases, for 
instance, in which contractual terms are contained in tickets 
or other documents which are not signed, the courts can do a 
great deal, and have done much, to protect the holder of,the 
ticket from attempts to deprive him of common lav/ rights9 with­
out taking adequate steps to make him aware that that is being 
done. In this way they do at least ensure a measure of public­
ity for unfair terms. In the interpretation of contracts, al­
so, the courts have various weapons at their disposal for at­
tributing to a contract its least objectionable meaning. But 
it has to be recognised that the judicial armoury is not really 
equal to the task; the dogma of freedom of contract, and the.
consensual theory of contract which is its corollary, fore- 
stall any really fundamental reform at the hands of the courts. 
Moreover, nearly all judicial achievement in this field is of 
a temporary nature; is, indeed, self-defeating; because each 
set-back received by the draftsmen of standard form contracts 
educates them in more effective draftmanship# Every holding 
of a court that a certain contractual clause is ineffective, 
indicates at the same time the way in which it can be made ef­
fective* And the draftsmen are quick to learn.
We must, then, look elsewhere than to judicial ini­
tiative for substantial reform, which is to say that we shall 
almost certainly have to put our faith in legislation. The 
apologetic manner in which I make the suggestion is due to my 
legal training - in the course of his education the lawyer ab­
sorbs from his academic mentors an unbounded respect for the 
common law, because it is old and picturesque, and an acute 
distaste for legislation, because it is new and he plays no 
part in it* Thus there will have to be overcome the profes­
sional suspicion of all encroachments by legislation in the 
fields of common law, and the legislature itself will have to 
be persuaded of the^necessity for action - no easy task, Ï 
have little doubt, however, that eventually legislative inter­
vention will be recognised as necessary. What forms should 
such legislation take?
The suggestion has been made that approved standard 
forms of contract should receive legislative force, and be made 
obligatory in certain trades and businesses dealing with the 
ptiblic. Some individual variation in these contracts would be 
permissible, but not in regard to the liabilities assumed or 
contracted out of by the parties* This is a suggestion calcul­
ated to cause alarm amongst staunch upholders of freedom of 
contact, especially those who regard it as one aspect of pers­
onal freedom. But once it is realised that in many fields free­
dom of contract no longer exists, this type of objection may 
suhside. It may even be hoped that some restoration of real 
contractual freedom may be brought about by this means* In the 
words of the writer of a recent article in the Columbia Law 
Review,7 '
"by judicious legal limitation on the bargaining 
power of the economically and legally stronger, it 
is conceivable that the economically weak would 
acquire greater freedom of contract than they now 
have - freedom to resist more effectively the bar­
gaining power of the strong and to obtain better 
terms"•
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Certainly this proposal has the advantage that it 
retains the benefits of standardisation, and involves recog­
nition and even extension of established business usage*
In trades or businesses where authoritative stan­
dardisation of contracts is not practicable, an alternative 
method would be to prohibit certain terms of an objectionable 
nature, or to require inclusion of certain terms - in effect, 
partial standardisation. In cases where even this is not 
practicable, the courts may be given an overriding power to 
disregard terms of an unreasonable or unjust nature* The 
former measures will give greater certainty; this last, grea­
ter flexibility, at the expense of some certainty.
Precedents exist for legislative intervention of 
these kinds. Hire-purchase contracts are already partially 
standardised by law, and in addition the courts have certain 
overriding powers in regard to them, in the exercise of which 
they can disregard express terms of the contract.
Whatever proposals for reform are made will have to 
reckon with the magical significance which is at present at­
tributed to the act of signature. By and large it is true that 
the man in the street exercises some measure of caution before 
signing a document. He is aware that signature will have legal 
consequences. But the legal inference which is drawn from the 
fact of signature, that it implies consent to all the terms ap­
pearing in the document, is to my mind nothing better than a 
fiction, and one.which has no reference to the probabilities 
of the situation. The significance which people attach to 
signature was formerly much greater than it is today, for the 
reason that the juristic acts to which assent was indicated in 
this matter were for the most part important transactions en­
tered Into by merchants or by proprietors of land - the great 
mass of the people had no occasion to execute deeds of convey­
ance or of trust, and charter parties and bills of lading were 
not within their ken, With the great extension of credit fac­
ilities in more recent times, with the growth of insurance in 
its many ramifications, and with the general increase in dom­
estic consumption, the ordinary man, if the term is permissi­
ble, enters into contracts of an importance and complexity 
quite outside the experience of his ancestors. Many of these 
contracts are of long duration, the legal techniques which 
they employ may be far from simple - for example, those invol­
ved in- the process of purchasing a flat - and more often than 
not they are couched in a jargon which is both obscure and 
technical, in the interpretation of which even courts of law
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are apt to have difficulty. In contracts like this, what does 
the signature of the consumer-party really express? Does he 
really mean by it that he is willing to commit himself to what** 
ever terms are there, whatever their true interpretation, how­
ever grossly unfair, however misunderstood by him? Is it rea­
sonable to attribute such an intention to him as a matter of 
law, as is at present done? I would suggest that what signa­
ture really does express is that the signatory intends to con­
tract on a basis which has already been reached orally, and on 
the assumption that the written document does not depart from 
that basis) and, furthermore, that it contains only terms which 
are usual, reasonable and fair# This assumption is not uncom­
monly disappointed. In that event the law offers at present 
very H a l t e d  relief,
A further obstacle to reform, which proceeds from the 
consensual theory of contract, is that a court*s attention is 
always focussed upon the time of making of the contract. Sub­
sequently occurring events are evaluated in terms of what the 
parties said and did, and what it is pleased to suppose they 
had in their minds, at the time the contract was made, even 
though they could not possibly have foreseen the events in 
question. The court has in general no power to consider the 
facts as they exist at the time the action is brought, and how 
these facts may put the relation between the parties in a dif­
ferent light - what gain either party might have had to that 
point, or what loss incurred, or how property may have appre­
ciated or depreciated in value. This is another illustration 
of the doctrine that the court*s role in the law of contract is 
a passive role, and that it should do no more than lend the 
state machinery of enforcement to one party on the theory that 
the parties are sovereign; with the consequence that it takes no 
account of the fact that one only of the parties was sovereign, 
and the other not sovereign but subject,
I think it is not too much to say that an entirely new 
conception of contract is needed in these tines» It needs to be 
recognised that the parties to a contract do not dwell in a pri­
vate legal domain of their own making, and that where contracts 
have the character of legislation imposed by powerful organisa­
tions upon large sections of the public, the content of such 
legislation is a matter of public interest, and if necessary of 
public control# The law of contract, in short, needs to be seen 
as an instrument of social engineering, and one which must be 
used in the best interests of society as a whole.
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